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1. INTRODUCTION
The expansion of professional service firms into the business
of law has been called the most important issue to face the legal
profession.1 This phenomenon is most visible in the activity of
the Big Five accounting firms.2 These firms, once involved only
in accounting and tax work, have expanded into contracts, merg-
ers and acquisitions, and even litigation.3 "All of the Big F" Ve are
actively pursuing clients- and offering legal services- in markets
as diverse as France, Spain, Australia, Canada, and the Confedera-
tion of the Independent States of the former Soviet Union."4
Most European countries allow accounting firms to engage the
practice of law themselves or to affiliate with independent law
firms.'
* J.D. Candidate 2001, University of Pennsylvania School of Law; B.A.
Economics 1996, Duke University. The author thanks Professor Gary A.
Munneke of Pace University School of Law for his contribution to this Com-
ment.
' See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice to the ABA House of
Delegates, Background Paper on Multidisciplinary Practice: Issues and Develop-
ments, Jan. 1999, at Cover Letter [hereinafter Background Paper].
2 The Big Five accounting firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Arthur An-
dersen, KPMG Peat Marwick, Ernst & Young, and Deloitte Touche Toh-
matsu.
' See John Gibeaut, Squeeze Play, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1998, at 42, 42-43. Much
of the expansion of the Big Five is a natural extension of services they already
provide. Elijah Farrel, Accounting Firms and the Unauthorized Practice of Law :
Who Is the Bar Really Trying to Protect?, 33 IND. L. REV. 599, 599 (2000).
Dianne Molvig, Multidisciplinary Practices: Service Package of the Future,
WIs. LAW., Apr. 1999, at 44, available at http://www.wisbar.org/wislawmag/
archive/april99/mdp2.html.
s See Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 44. Businesses combining the services of at-
torneys and other professionals, commonly referred to as multidisciplinary
practices, are allowed in Australia, Canada, and other European countries such
as France and Spain. See Molvig, supra note 4, at 11.
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The Big Five accounting firms have made "significant head-
way into the practice of law in Europe,"6 and "most observers
agree, the accounting giants are muscling into the [U.S.] legal
market."7 So why is the incursion of the Big Five on U.S. law
firms a problem? Some fear that even though "lawyers retain a
monopoly on the representation of clients in court, many other
services are up for grabs."' However, the legal profession cannot
justify ethics rules because of the economic protections they af-
ford attorneys; to be justified, they must serve the public interest.
The real debate is whether multidisciplinary practices ('"DPs")
actually serve the clients' best interest or are detrimental because
they trample the attorney/client privilege, pose problems regard-
ing conflicts of interest, and infringe on professional independent
judgment.9
In 1998, the ABA created the Commission on Multidisciplin-
ary Practice ("Commission") to study MDPs and to propose
changes to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. In August
1999, the Commission recommended that the ABA House of
Delegates vote to amend Model Rule 5.4, which currently bans
fee-splitting and partnerships with non-attorneys.1" However, the
ABA House of Delegates voted in 1999 to postpone amendment
of the Model Rules until further study demonstrated that the
modification would further the public interest and would not
jeopardize lawyers' ethical obligations." In July 2000, after an
6 John Gibeaut & James Podgers, Feeling the Squeeze, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1998,
at 88; Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 42.
" Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 43; see also Lawrence J. Fox, Defend Our Clients,
Defend Our Profession, PA. LAW., July-Aug. 1999, at 20, 21 (1999) ("While we
slept, the Big Five have systematically hired thousands of our best and bright-
est.").
' Gary A. Munneke, Dances witb Nonlawyers: A New Perspective on Law
Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 562 (1992).
' Donald S. Gray, Multidisciplinary Practice of Law, ORANGE COUNTY
LAW., Apr. 1999, at 5.
"o See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report, at http://www.
abanet. org/cpr/mdpreport.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2000); MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1998); House of Delegates 2000 Annual Meeting
Summary of Recommendations, at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/ rec-
ommend2/117.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2000).
" Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Florida Bar Recommenda-
tion, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2000).
The ABA House of Delegates adopted the resolution put forth by the Florida
Bar at the August 1999 meeting. IT
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additional year of study, the Commission again recommended
amending Model Rule 5.4 to the ABA House of Delegates. 2 The
ABA House of Delegates, however, voted "by a 3-1 margin.., to
continue the ban on lawyers partnering with non-lawyers in mul-
tidisciplinary practices."
13
Although the ABA rejected the Commission's proposal re-
garding MDPs, the issue is far from decided. Current law actually
requires attorneys to work with professionals from other disci-
plines. In fact, MDPs are presently in existence in the United
States. MDPs are not a new phenomenon, nor are they going to
disappear.
This Comment will give an overview of the current legal
situation regarding MDPs in the United States. Section 2 analyzes
the current ethics rules governing the creation of MDPs in the
United States and compares it to the legal system in Canada. Sec-
tion 3 explores the significance of the problems surrounding
MDPs and investigates the activities of the Big Five accounting
firms. Section 4 surveys the arguments in favor of and against al-
lowing MDPs and Section 5 suggests several reasons why the
Model Rules should be amended to allow MDPs. This Comment
concludes that Model Rule 5.4 should be amended for three rea-
sons: first, the current rule serves lawyers' financial interests
rather than the public interest; second, it is an economic rather
than ethical rule and does not belong in the Model Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct; and third, foreign countries provide a positive
model endorsing the formation of MDPs.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT LEGAL SITUATION
2.1. Rules Governing MDPs
A multidisciplinary practice provides integrated services from
both lawyers and non-lawyers.' In a multidisciplinary partner-
ship, lawyers share fees or enter into partnerships with profes-
sionals from different disciplines (e.g., a lawyer and an account-
12 See House of Delegates 2000 Annual Meeting Summary of Recommen-
dations, at http://www.aanet.org/leadership/recommend2/117.html (last vis-
ited Sept. 29, 2000).
13 Wendy Davis, MDP Overwhelmingly Rejected, N.Y.LJ., July 12, 2000, at
1. 14 See Background Paper, supra note 1, at 4 n.1.
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ant, a lawyer and a financial planner, or a lawyer and a social
worker)."5 The following Section examines how different rules in
a variety of jurisdictions treat MDPs.
2.2. ABA Model Rule 5.4
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("Model
Rules") preclude lawyers from sharing fees or entering into part-
nerships with non-lawyers.16 The Model Rules are generally ac-
knowledged as a national standard and the ABA is accepted as the
"national leader for discussing, drafting, and promulgating rules
governing lawyer conduct." 7
The current version of Rule 5.4 effectively bans MDPs with
provisions designed to prevent or limit the influence by non-
lawyer third parties.1 8 Model Rule 5.4(a) prohibits lawyers from
fee-sharing with non-lawyers, Model Rule 5.4(b) prevents partner-
ships with non-lawyers if the activities are not ancillary to the
practice of law, and Model Rule 5.4(d) precludes lawyers from
15 See id. The MDP Commission's 1999 Final Report offered the following
definition of MDPs:
Multidisciplinary practice denotes a partnership, professional corpora-
tion, or other association or entity that inclufes lawyers and nonlaw-
yers and has as one, but not all, of its purposes the delivery of legal
services to a client(s) other than the MDP itself or that holds itself out
to the public as providing nonlegal, as well as legal, services. It in-
cludes an arrangement by which a law firm joins with one or more
other professional firms to provide service, and there is a direct or in-
direct sharing of profits as part of the arrangement.
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report, at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdpfinalreport.html (Fast visited Nov. 16, 1999).
16 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1998).
17 Promoting Professionalism: ABA Programs, Plans and Strategies, at 9
[hereinafter Promoting Professionalism]. Further information on this material
may be obtained by calling 1-800-285-2221.
18 See Background Paper, supra note 1, at 11. These rules do not preclude,
and the current debate does not include the issue of, lawyers working with
professionals in other disciplines to solve client problems when they are not
engaged in fee splitting or partnerships.
There is nothing in those rules that prohibits a lawyer from working
with a professional trained in another discipline if such cooperation is
needed to solve the client's difficulties. A lawyer may directly employ
such a professional on the lawyer's staff, retain an unaffiliated profes-
sional with the client's counsel, or assist a professional who is sepa-
rately retained by the client.
Id. at 11.
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practicing in a professional corporation if a non-lawyer owns an
interest, has the right to control, or is a director in that corpora-
tion.19
2.3. History of the Code
Since 1928, rules governing lawyers in the United States have
precluded the formation of MDPs.2 ° The stated purpose of the
19 Model Rule 5.4 states:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reason-
able period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate
*or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or
disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 1.17,
pay to the estate or other representative of that lawyer the agreed-
upon purchase price; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm ma include nonlawyer employees in
compensation or retirement plans, even though the plan is based
in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
(b) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of
the activities of the partnership consist of-the practice of law.
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or
pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regu-
late the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal serv-
ices.
(d) A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary
representative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or in-
terest of the lawyer for a reasonable time during administration;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.
MODEL RULES OF PRoF' CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1998).
20 Ethical standards promulgated by the ABA have been adopted by forty-
two jurisdictions; however, with the exception of the District of Columbia
(discussed infra Section 2.4.), prohibitions against forming partnerships with
nonlawyers are contained in the ethics codes of all states. See ABA/BNA LAW.
MAN. PROF. CONDUCT 91:401.
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rule prohibiting lawyers from forming partnerships with non-
lawyers is to safeguard lawyers' professional judgment from the
pressures and problems that could arise if non-lawyers had
authority over lawyers.2 The fear that lawyers would violate
their ethical duties when pressured by non-lawyers is based on the
realization that non-lawyers "are not subject to the same ethical
mandates regarding independence, conflicts of interest, fees and
the other important provisions of the [legal] profession's code of
conduct."2
2.3.1. Canons of Professional Ethics
Although not found in the original 1908 version of the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibitions against "nonlawyer
financial or managerial involvement in the business of law" were
added in 1928.' The addition of Canons 33 to 35 in 1928 was in-
terpreted to "prohibit nearly any form of business association be-
tween lawyers and nonlawyers that offered legal services to the
public. 24
21 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-392, in
FORMAL AND INFoRMAL ETHIcS OPINIONS 1983-1998, 311-319 (1995) [herein-
after ABA Ethics Opinion]. "[T]he Model Code and the Model Rules both
seek to protect the independence of the 'professional judgment of a lawyer' in
the following general ways: prohibiting lawyers from forming partnerships
with a nonlawyer to practice law and proscribing the sharing [of] fees with a
nonlawyer." Derek A. Denckla, Nonawyers and the Unauthorized Practice of
Law: An Overview of the Legal and Ethical Parameters, 67 FoRDHAM L. REV.
2581, 2587 (1999); see also Farrell, supra note 3, at 616.
' ABA Ethics Opinion, supra note 21.
23 Thomas R. Andrews, Nonlauyers in the Business of Law: Does the One
Who Has the Gold Really Make the Rules?, 40 HASTINGS L.. 577, 584 (1989).
24 Id. at 588. Canon 33 provided in part:
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person
should be admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not
a member of the legal profession, duly authorized to practice, and
amenable to professiona-discipline.... Partnerships between lawyers
and members of other professions or non-professional persons should
not be formed or permitted where a part of the partnership business
consists of the practice of law.
CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 33 (1928). Canons 34 and 35 also contain
related provisions. Canon 34 provided that "[n]o division of fees for legal serv-
ices is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or
responsibity." CANONS OF PROF'L ETHIS, Canon 34 (1928). Canon 35 pro-
viced that [t]he professional services of a lawyer should not be controllea or
exploited by any-lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer.... He should avoid all relations which direct the perform-
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2.3.2. Model Code of Professional Responsibility
The Canons were replaced by the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility ('Model Code") in 1969.2 Portions of Canons 33
and 34 became Disciplinary Rules in the Model Code; however,
Canon 35, which prohibited lawyers from permitting nonlawyers
to control their services, did not survive in the new Model Code
as a discrete rule.26 Canon 33, prohibiting partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers became Disciplinary Rule ('DR") 3-
103(A),' and Canon 34, which prohibited fee-splitting, became
DR 3-102(A).28
2.3.3. Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Ethics rules in the United States underwent'another major re-
vision and in 1983 the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
("Model Rules") replaced the Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. 9 Although the 1983 changes did not ultimately affect
Model Rule 5.4, which bans non-lawyer involvement in the law,
the rule was the subject of much review and debate by the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, known as
the "Kutak Commission."30
ance of his duties by or in the interest of such intermediary." CANONS OF
PROF'L ETHICS, Canon 35 (1928).
25 One perspective is that the Code's replacement did not change the
treatment of MDPs.
Within five years of the ABA's adoption of the Model Code, practi-
cally every state in the union had adopted it either officially or unoffi-
cially. Although the format and the content of the old Canons
changed dramatically in the new Model Code, the content of the re-
strictions on lawyer-nonlawyer business associations did not.
Andrews, supra note 23, at 588.
26 Id. at 589.
27 See id. at 588. DR 3-103(A) provided that "[a] lawyer shall not form a
partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist
of the practice of law." MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-
103(A) (1969).
28 Andrews, supra note 23, at 588. DR 3-102(A) provided that "[a] lawyer
or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non-lawyer...." MODEL CODE OF
PROFtRESPONSIBITY DR 3-102(A) (1969).
29 Andrews, supra note 23, at 593.
30 Id. at 593-96.
2000]
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In 1976, the Kutak Commission proposed an amended Rule
5.4 that would have allowed the formation of MDPs.3" The Ku-
tak Commission's version of Rule 5.4 allowed lawyers "to share
fees with nonlawyers... so long as the nonlawyers agreed not to
influence the lawyer's independent professional judgment and to
abide by the rules of legal ethics regarding confidentiality, solicita-
tion, and legal fees."32 However, the proposed version of Rule 5.4
was opposed on several grounds, including fear that it would
permit accounting firms to open law firms and compete with tra-
ditional ones,33 fear that non-lawyer ownership would threaten
lawyers' independent judgment, and fear that it would have a
"fundamental but unknown effect on the legal profession."34
Based on these objections, the proposal under the Kutak Com-
mission addressing the subject of non-lawyer involvement in the
law was rejected in favor of an absolute ban on fee sharing.35
31 See id at 593-94. The text of the proposed amended Rule 5.4 reads as
follows:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial
interest is held or managerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer, or
by a lawyer acting in a capacity other than that of representing clients,
such as a business corporation, insurance company, legal services or-
ganization or government agency, but only if:
(a) There is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) Information relating to representation of the client is pro-
tected as required by Rule 1.6;
(c) The organization does not engage in advertising or personal
contact with prospective clients if a lawyer employed by the
organization would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 7.2
or Rule 7.3; and
(d) The arrangement does not result in charging a fee that vio-
lates Rule 1.5.
IaL
ABA Ethics Opinion supra note 21; Farrell, supra note 3, at 618.
3 Another concern was that large department stores, such as J.C. Penny
or Sears, would open their own law firms and provide even greater competi-
tion. Andrews, supra note 23, at 595-96.
34 Id.
31 See id at 596.
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2.4. Washington, D.C. s Version
Washington, D.C. ("D.C.") is the only jurisdiction that per-
mits lawyers to share fees with non-lawyers.36 Rule 5.4 of the
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct allows lawyers and non-
lawyers to form partnerships and share fees.3" The ethics rule
36 Gianluca Morello, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law
Firms: Why Multi-Discipline Practices Should be Permitted in the United States, 21
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 190, 207 (1997); Janet Conley, Ernst & Young Set to Hire
Tax Lawyers, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 7, 1999, at 4.
" Rule 5.4 ("Professional Independence of a Lawyer") of the Washington,
D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer,
except that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the payment of money, over a reason-
able period of time after the lawyer's death, to the lawyer's estate
or to one or more specified persons;
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal busi-
ness of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of the deceased
lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly
represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer;
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a
compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan is based in
who e or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement; and
(4) Sharing of fees is permitted in a partnership or other form of
organization which meets the requirements of paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may practice law in a partnership or other form of or-
ganization in which a financial interest is held or managerial authority
is exercised by an individual nonlawyer who performs professional
services which assist the organization in providing legal services to cli-
ents, but only if:
(1) The partnership or organization has as its sole purpose pro-
viding legal services to clients;
(2) All persons having such managerial authorit or holding a fi-
nancial interest undertake to abide by these rules of professional
conduct;
(3) The lawyers who have a financial interest or managerial
authority in the partnership or organization undertake to be re-
sponsible for the nonlawyer participants to the same extent as if
nonlawyer participants were lawyers under Rule 5.1;
(4) The foregoing conditions are set forth in writing.
2000]
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seems broad but it "does not give blanket approval to a multidis-
ciplinary practice."38 The D.C. rule restricts fee-sharing and part-
nership agreements to organizations that are structured as law
firms and solely provide legal services to clients.39 The D.C. rule
is further tempered by ABA Formal Opinion 91-360, which pro-
hibits law firms with offices in more than one jurisdiction from
forming partnerships with non-lawyer professionals in the D.C.
office.' Thus, D.C. is the only jurisdiction in the United States
that allows fee-splitting and partnerships with non-attorneys;
however, such arrangements are only allowed where the attor-
neys are providing legal services and the non-attorneys are provid-
ing services that are incidental to the legal services.
2.5. The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice's
1999 and 2000 Recommendations and the ABA
House of Delegates'Response
2.5.1. MDP Commission s 1999 Report and Recommendation
In August 1998, Philip S. Anderson, former President of the
American Bar Association, appointed a twelve-person Commis-
sion on Multidisciplinary Practice41 to "study and report on the
extent to which and the manner in which professional service
firms operated by accountants and others who are not lawyers are
seeking to provide legal services to the public."42 Well-known
practitioners, judges, and academics comprised the Committee to
(c) A lawyer shall not permit a person who recommends, employs, or
pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regu-
!ate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such legal serv-
ices.
WASHINGTON, D.C. RULES oF PROF't CONDUcT R. 5.4 (1999).
" Background Paper, supra note 1, at 14.
39 IL at 17 n.5; Morello, supra note 36, at 207-09.
40 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 91-360
(1991); see also Molvig, supra note 4, at 12.
41 Background Paper, supra note 1, at 2; Commission on, Multidisciplinary
Practice Report, supra note 10.
42 Background Paper, supra note 1, at App. A; News Release, ABA Presi-
dent Philip S. Anderson Appoints Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice,
Aug. 4, 1998.
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provide a comprehensive sampling of views within the legal pro-
fession.43
"The Commission was asked to place the interests of clients
and the public ahead of those of the bar, as lawyers do every day
in resolving potential conflicts of interest."" The Commission
heard sixty hours of testimony from fifty-six witnesses and re-
viewed written comments from numerous others.4' In January
1999, the MDP Commission published an informational paper
addressing the developments in multidisciplinary practice and the
issues facing the business of law.46 The Commission also submit-
ted reports with recommendations endorsing the amendment of
Rule 5.4 at both the 1999 and 2000 Annual Meetings of the
American Bar Association.47
2.5.2. MDP Commission's Final Report 1999
In a unanimous decision, the Commission recommended that
Rule 5.4 be revised to allow fee-splitting and partnerships between
lawyers and non-lawyers. 48 The Commission wrote that "[w]hile
43 PA. BAR ASS N COMM'N ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY PRACTICE AND
RELATED TRENDS AFFECTING THE PROFESSION, PRELIMINARY REPORT TO
1999 MID-YEAR MEETING OF PBA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 4 (Sept. 15, 1999)
[hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]; Background Paper, supra note 1, at 2.
4' Philip S. Anderson, If a Multidisciplinary Practice Offers Legal Services, Its
Lawyers Must Be Regulated, NATL L.J., Aug. 9, 1999, at B7. *
41 See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, Report to the House of
Delegates, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpreport.htnil (last visited Nov. 8,
2000); ABA Multidisciplinary Practice Commission Recommends Amending Rules
to Allow MDPs, 67 LEGAL NEWS, June 15, 1999, at 2742 [hereinafter ABA Rec-
ommendation]. The Commission's Report also noted that
[tlestimony and/or written materials have been presented by U.S. and
foreign lawyers, consumer advocates, representatives of four of the
five largest accounting firms in the world, law professors, chairs of
ABA sections and standing committees, officers offoreign and domes-
tic bar associations, ethics counsel of foreign and domestic bar associa-
tions, small business clients, the American Corporate Counsel Asso-
ciation and in-house counsel of international corporations.
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 45.
46 See Background Paper, supra note 1; PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note
43, at4.
41 See Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 45; see alsoCommission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House of Delegates,
at http://www.abanet.org/mdpfinalrep2000.htmil (uly 2000).
48 The first recommendation of the ABA Commission stated: "The legal
profession should adopt and maintain rules of professional conduct that pro-
2000]
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detailed empirical data is not available, representatives of both in-
dividual and corporate clients expressed support for relaxing the
rules of professional conduct that currently either foreclose or
make it extremely difficult" to form MDPs.4
The Commission decided that clients have an interest in hav-
ing the option of lawyers and non-lawyers practicing together in
MDPs. 0 The highlights of the Commission's report are:
1. Lawyers would be able to form partnerships, and share
legal fees, with nonlawyers.
2. Lawyers in MDPs offering legal services would be
bound by the same ethics rules as lawyers in traditional
law firms, including the imputation-of-knowledge standard
of Model Rule 1.10.
3. Nonlawyers working on the same team as lawyers on a
client's matter within an MDP would be bound by the
lawyer's conflict rules as to that matter.
4. Nonlawyers in MDPs would not be permitted to prac-
tice law.
tect its core values, independence of professional judgment, protection of con-
fidential client information, and loyalty to the client through avoidance of con-
flicts of interest, but should not permit existing rules to unnecessarily inhibit
the development of new structures for the more effective delivery of services
and better public access to the legal system." ABA Commission on Multidisci-
plin Practice Report to the House of Delegates: Recommendation, at
http:/www.abanet.org/cpr/mdprecommendation.html (last visited Nov. 8,
2000).
" Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 45; PRELIMINARY
REPORT, supra note 43, at 8.
50 See Anderson, supra note 44, at B7.
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5. Safeguards must be implemented to guarantee the abil-
ity of lawyers within an MDP to exercise independence of
their professional judgment, as lawyers in law firms, cor-
porations, and other existing practice forms are already
bound to do."1
The Commission's focus in preparing the proposed regulation
was on the protection of the core values of the legal system: pre-
serving the independence of lawyers' advice, protecting clients' se-
crets, and loyalty to clients through avoidance of conflicts of in-
terest. "These goals would be attained by making professional
conduct rules that apply to lawyers in traditional law firms apply
equally to any lawyer delivering legal services to the public, re-
gardless of the practice setting." 2
The MDP Commission submitted a draft of a new Model
Rule 5.8, entitled 'Responsibilities of a Lawyer in a Multidisci-
plinary Practice Firm."' The proposed rule required that MDPs
be subject to the same ethical rules that apply to lawyers in tradi-
tional firms,5" adopt specific procedures and policies to protect the
lawyers' core values, obtain licenses to practice as MDPs, and
submit to annual audits.55 Neither the proposed rule nor the
51 ABA Recommendation, supra note 45, at 2743.
52 Anderson, supra note 44, at B7.
51 Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 45, at App. A.
14 In addition, the highest appellate state court of each state would be re-
sponsible for regulating MDPs. See id. "MDPs owned by nonlawers would
be required to obtain a license to practice as an MDP, and the license feeswoul[ f nance the cost of r gulati n." Ander on, supra note 44, at B. "A li-
censed MDP would have to certify at specified intervals, usually every year ortwo, that it is in compliance w th the rules and that nonlawyers at th  firm
have not interfered with the independence of advice given by lawyers." Id.
Critics point out that state supreme court justices already have too
much to do and should not be expected also to license MDPs and
regulate lawyers who practice in them. If state supreme courts do not
protect the public, however, who will?...
The alternatives are to permit MDP lawyers to remain unregulated,
to attempt to regulate them without their employers' consent or to
prohibit lawyers from providing services in MDPs. All seem imprac-
tical, if not improvident, compared to the commission's proposal.
Id.
11 See ABA Recommendation, supra note 45, at 2743; see also Anderson, su-
pra note 44.
2000)
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Commission's recommendation would allow non-lawyers to
practice law. 6
2.5.3. ABA Resolution, August 1999
In August 1999, the ABA House of Delegates decided to post-
pone endorsing the Commission's proposal"' and stated that it
would not sanction MDPs until further study showed that the
5 The Commission defined the practice of law as including the following
conduct when undertaken on another's behalf:
(a) Preparing any legal document, including. any deeds, mort-
gaes, assignments, discharges, leases, trust instruments or any
otner instruments intended to affect interests in real or per-
sonal property, wills, codicils, instruments intended to affect
the disposition of property of decedents' estates, documents
relating to business and corporate transactions, other instru-
ments intended to affect or secure legal rights, and contracts
except routine agreements incidenta to a regular course of
business;
(b) Preparing or expressing legal opinions;
(c) Appearing or acting as an attorney at any tribunal;
(d) Preparing any claims, demands or pleadings of any kind, or
any written documents containing legal argument or inter-
pretation of law, for filing in any court, administrative
agency or other tribunal;
(e) Providing advice or counsel as to how any of the activities de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) through (d) might be done or
whether they were done, in accor ance with applicable law;
or
(f) Furnishing an attorney or attorneys, or other persons, to
render the services described in subparagraphs (a) through (e)
above.
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, supra note 45, at App. A.
17 That decision stated:
RESOLVED, That the American Bar Association make no change,
addition or amendment to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
which permits a lawyer to offer legal services through a multidisci-
plinary practice unless and until additonal study demonstrates that
such changes will further the public interest without sacrificing or
compromising lawyer independence and the legal profession's tradi-
tion of loyalty to clients.
ABA Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates, Aug. 1999, at http://
www.abanet.org/cpr/flbarrec.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2000).
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formation of MDPs would further the public interest rather than
jeopardize the core values that the ABA sought to protect. 8
2.5.4. MDP Commission's 2000 Report and Recommendation
After an additional year of careful study, the MDP Commis-
sion once again proposed a "policy to permit lawyers to share fees
and join with nonlawyers in a practice that delivers both legal and
nonlegal professional services... provided that the lawyers have
the control and authority necessary to assure lawyer independ-
ence in the rendering of legal services." 9 The Commission stated
that "[t]he forces of change are bearing down on society and the
legal profession with an unprecedented intensity... [and the] le-
gal profession must take a proactive role ... in order to best serve
the public interest and maintain its crucial role in the mainte-
nance of a democratic society."6" The MDP Commission recom-
mended the following:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association amend
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct consistent with
the following principles:
58 ABA Refuses to Change Ethics Rules Unless Studies of MDPs Dispel Con-
cerns, 15 CONFERENCE REP., Aug. 18, 1999, at 396.
59 A.B.A., COMMISSION ON MULTIDISCIPINARY PRACTICE REPORT TO
THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.
html (last visited Oct. 24, 2000).
60 Id. The Commission found that the driving forces behind change in the
legal profession are:
continued client interest in more efficient and less costly legal services;
client dissatisfaction with the delays and outcomes in the legal system
as they affect both dispute resolution and transactions; avances in
technology and telecommunications; globalization; new competition
through services such as computerized self-help legal software, legal
advice sites on the Internet, and the wide-reaching, stepped-up activi-ties of banks, investment companies, and financi planners providing
products that embody a signi icant amount of lega engineering; and
the strategy of Big Five professional services firms and their smaller-
size counterparts that has resulted in thousands of lawyers providing
services to the public while denying their accountability to the lawyer
regulatory system.
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Lawyers should be permitted to share fees and join with
nonlawyer professionals in a practice that delivers both le-
gal and nonlegal professional services (Multidisciplinary
Practice), provided that the lawyers have the control and
authority necessary to assure lawyer independence in the
rendering of legal services. "Nonlawyer professionals"
means members of recognized professions or other disci-
plines that are governed by ethical standards.
This Recommendation must be implemented in a manner
that protects the public and preserves the core values of
the legal profession, including competence, independence
of professional judgment, protection of confidential client
information, loyalty to the client through the avoidance of
conflicts of interest, and pro bono publico obligations.
Regulatory authorities should enforce existing rules and
adopt such additional enforcement procedures as are
needed to implement these principles and to protect the
public interest.
The prohibition on nonlawyers delivering legal services
and the obligations of all lawyers to observe the rules of
professional conduct should not be altered.
Passive investment in a Multidisciplinary Practice should
not be permitted.61
The Commission's Recommendation in favor of allowing
MDPs was submitted to the House of Delegates for consideration
at the 2000 Annual Meeting.62 After two years of extensive study,
61 Id
62 Id
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the Commission believed that its proposal "recognize[d] the reali-
ties of a changing marketplace, open[ed] up new avenues for serv-
ice to clients, respond[ed] to the suggestions of consumer advo-
cates, and provide[d] new opportunities for lawyers."63 The ABA
House of Delegates did not agree.
2.5.5. ABA Resolution, July 2000
On July 11, 2000, by a margin of nearly 3-to-i, the Commis-
sion's Recommendation was rejected." The anti-MDP resolu-
tion" was sponsored by New York, New Jersey, Illinois, Florida,
63 Id
" See John Gibeaut, "It's a Done Deal. House of Delegates Vote Crushes
Chances for MDP, 86 A.B.A. J. 92, 93 (2000) ("The 314-106 vote at the New
York sessions of the association's annual meeting came after a coalition of state
and local bars went head-on against the ABA Commission on Multidisciplmna
Practice, which had pushed or relaxation of professional conduct rules to al-
low lawyers and other disciplines to join together as single businesses.").
65 The anti-MDP resolution included the following points:
RESOLVED, that each jurisdiction is urged to revise its law governing
lawyers to implement the following principles and preserve the core
values of the legal profession:
1. It is in the public interest to preserve the core values of the le-
gal profession, among which are:
a. the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client;
b. the lawyer's duty competently to exercise independent le-
gal judgment for the benefit of the client;
c. the lawyer's duty to hold client confidences inviolate;
d. the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the
client; and
e. the lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profession of
law with responsibilities as a representative of clients, an offi-
cer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special re-
sponsibility Tor the quality of justice.
2. All lawyers are members of one profession subject in each ju-
risdiction to the law governing lawyers.
3. The law governing lawyers was developed to protect the public
interest and to preserve the core values of the legal profession,
that are essential to the proper functioning of the American jus-
tice system.
4. State bar associations and other entities charged with attorney
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and Ohio. The resolution enumerated the "core values" of the le-
gal profession and announced that MDPs were not compatible
with those values.66 In addition, the July vote disbanded the
ABA's Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice.6'
discipline should reaffirm their commitment to enforcing vigor-
ously their respective law governing lawyers.
5. Each jurisdiction should reevaluate and refine to the extent
necessary the definition of "the practice of law."
6. Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar
the practice of law by entities other than law firms.
7. The sharing of legal fees with non-la ers and the ownership
and control of the practice of law by nolawyers are inconsistent
with the core values of the legal profession.
8. The law governing lawyers, that prohibits lawyers from shar-
ing legal fees with nonlawyers and from directly or indirectly
transferring to nonlawyers ownership or control over entities
practicing raw, should not be revised.
FURTHER RESOLVED that the Standing Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility of the American Bar Association shall, in
consultation with state, local and territorial bar associations and inter-
ested ABA sections, divisions, and committees undertake a review of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct ("MRPC") and shall recom-
mend to the House of Delegates such amendments to the MRPC as
are necessary to assure that there are safegards in the MRPC relating
to strategic alliances and other contractu relationships with nonlegal
professional service providers consistent with the statement of princi-
ples in this Recommendation.
FURTHER RESOLVED that the American Bar Association recom-
mends that in jurisdictions that permit lawyers and law firms to own
and operate nonlegal businesses, no nonlawyer or nonlegal entity in-
volved in the provision of such services should own or control the
practice of law by a lawyer or law firm or otherwise be permitted to
direct or regulate the professional judgment of the lawyer or law firm
in rendering legal services to any person.
FURTHER RESOLVED that the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice be discharged with the Association's gratitude for the Com-
mission's hard work and with commendation for its substantial con-
tributions to the profession.
ILL. STATE BAR ASS'N ET AL., Recommendation at http://www.abanet.org/
cpr/mdprecomlOF.html (last visited Oct. 24, 20005.
66 Wendy Davis, ABA Emphatically Rejects MDPs, NAT'L L.J., July 24,
2000, at AS.
67 See Gibeaut, supra note 64, at 92.
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The ABA House of Delegates' recent decision on the MDP is-
sue has not settled the issue. Although the Commission com-
pleted its study, the August vote was premature, as many state
and local bar associations have yet to finish their individual stud-
ies of the MDP issue.68 The states that have commissioned a
study of MDPs but have not yet taken action include more than
500,000 lawyers, which is about half of the lawyers licensed in the
United States.69 The outcome of these studies could reverse the 3-
to-1 margin by which the MDP proposal was voted down this
year.
In the meantime, the House of Delegates has voted to "pre-
serve its core values" and maintain the status quo.70 However, as
former ABA President Philip Anderson said, the problem with
the House of Delegates vote is that "the ABA has lost the chance
to provide essential leadership on the most crucial issue of our
generation" 71 and has attempted to preserve a status quo that no
longer exists.
2.6. Current Ethics Rules Affecting the Existence of MDPs in
Canada
2.6.1. Overview of the MDP Situation in Canada
Fear of accounting firms capturing the legal market exists in
Canada as well as the United States.' In Canada, "the push for
MDPs has largely come from the... Big 5 accounting firms,
which, having seen revenue from some areas decline, have moved
aggressively into areas such as management and human resources
consulting and provision of legal and quasi-legal services."73 There
68 According to the Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, twenty-
three states have appointed committees to study the MDP issue but have not
yet returned reports, ten states have submitted reports that take no action,
three states have taken favorable action toward MDPs, nine states have taken
action against change, four states have not appointed commissions, and infor-
mation is not available from two states. ABA Commission on MDPs, MDP
Report on State Positions, at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpstats.html (last
visited Oct. 24, 2000).
69 See Gibeaut, supra note 64, at 93.
70 Id. at 92.
71 Id. at 93.
72 Luis Millan, Quebec Accounting Firms Already Seeking Law Partners,
LAW. WKLY., May 21, 1999.
"' Geoffrey Scotton, CPA Report Sees No Need for Bar to Control MDPs,
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has been extensive study of the MDP issue at both the federal and
provincial level in Canada, and not surprisingly, studies by or-
ganizations such as the Federation of Law Societies74 and the Ca-
nadian Bar Association ("CBA"') focus on protecting the core
values of the profession: "independence of the profession, avoid-
ance of conflicts of interest, preservation of client confidentiality,
and preservation of solicitor-client privilege."76 Surprisingly, their
conclusions regarding the feasibility of MDPs differ from those of
the American Bar Association.'
2.6.2. Current Status of Canadian Laws Regarding MDPs
The current status of laws regulating MDPs in Canada is not
much different than in the United States.78 Similar to Rule 5.4 of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Chapter XI of the Ca-
nadian Bar Association's Code of Professional Conduct bans a
non-lawyer from sharing in the profits generated by a law prac-
tice. 9
LAW. WKLY., Sept. 3, 1999.
' The Federation of the Legal Societies Profession is the umbrella orani-
zation that governs the administration of each of the governing bodies of legal
practice. Although each organization has promulgated its own reports, they
appear to be working parallel to each other on MDP issues.
7 The Canadian Bar Association is a national volunteer professional asso-
ciation. Similar to the American Bar Association, they provide a national
standard but are not responsible for creating governing law for any of the indi-
vidual law societies.
76 CAN. BAR ASS'N, THOMAS G. HEiNzTMAN, Q.C. ET AL., STRIKING A
BALANCE: THE REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW
COMMISSION ON MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 5 (1999), available at http://www.cba.org/MDP/StrikingA
Balance.asp (last visited Oct. 24, 2000) [hereinafter STRIKING A BALANCE].
' The CBA Report on MDPs "concludes that where emerging business
organizations include the practice of law, they need not be controlled by law-
yers." Scotton, supra note 73.
71 One commentator has noted that "[a]t the present time, the Canadian
legal profession's regulatory framework permits only some forms of multi-
disciplinary practice. For example, law firms may employ other professionals,
such as engineers, accountants and patent and trademark agents. However, law
society rules allow only lawyers to be partners of law firms...." MELINDA
BUCKLEY, SPECIAL COMM. ON THE INTI, PRAC. OF L., CAN. BAR ASSN
MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES: TOWARDS A POLICY FRAMEWORK 1, avail.
able at http://www.cba.org/Content/ MDPS/buckley mdp-paper.pdf (1998).
79 N.Z. LAW SoC'y, MULTI-DISCIPLINARY PRACTICES AND OTHER
RELATED MATTERS, Appendix, available at http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz/
general/mdp.htm (Apr. 1999). The CBA's Code of Professional Conduct,
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Like the United States, Canada has a minority jurisdiction.
The Law Society of Upper Canada ("LSUC"), which is the rule-
making body for all Ontario lawyers, has adopted a rule similar
to Rule 5.4 of Washington, D.C. In Ontario, By-Law 25 of the
Law Society Act endorses the principle that lawyers and non-
lawyers can become partners in MDPs if the MDP is controlled
by lawyers and its main business is the practice of law." The
LSUC requires application fees for MDPs and requires non-
lawyer partners to carry the same mandatory insurance as lawyer
partners." Thus, '"DPs are permitted in Ontario only if they
are controlled by lawyers, render only legal services and services
ancillary thereto, and are subject to the professional rules of the
legal profession."82
Although LSUC's rule appears to be progressive in the sense
that lawyers and non-lawyers can form partnerships in limited
situations, the Canadian Bar Association is recommending even
more lenient rules of professional conduct that would allow full
integration into MDPs.83 With the exception of the LSUC, this
policy is not expected to encounter opposition and is expected to
be carried out in many of the Canadian provinces in the coming
Chapter )G Fees, Commentary 8 provides: "any arrangement whereby the
lawyer directly or indirectly shares, splits or divides fees with notaries public,
law students, clerks or other nonlawyers who bring or refer business to the
lawyer's office is improper and constitutes professional misconduct."
BUCKLEY, supra note 78, at 1. Commentary 9 states that "the lawyer shall not
enter into a lease or other arrangement whereby a landlord or other person di-
rectly or indirectly shares in fees or revenues generated by the law practice."
Id.
10 Law Society of Upper Canada, Multi-Disciplinary Practices By-Law, By-
Law 25, available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/services bylaws en.
shtml#bylaw25 (last visited October 9, 2000). By-Law 25 was -adopted-by
LSUC on April 30, 1999 and amended on May 28, 1999. See New Zealand Law
Society, Multi-Disciplinary Practices and Other Related Matters, Apr. 1999, Ap-
pendix, available at http://www.nz-lawsoc.org.nz/general/mdp.htm at 2, (last
visited Oct. 24, 2000). See generally Eric Atkins, Rules on Acceptable Law Firms
Names Now Vary from Province to Province, LAW. WKLY., Sept. 22, 2000 (dis-
cussing the issues involved in naming an MDP).
" See MDP Application Fees Set by Law Society, LAW. WKLY., June 11, 1999
(stating that the LSUC approved application fees of $250 for MDPs with one
non-lawyer partner and $50 for each additional non-lawyer partner).
82 N.Y. STATE BAR ASSN, PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES OF THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION: THE PLACE OF MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICE IN THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 284 (April 2000) [hereinafter
PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES].
83 See Atkins, supra note 80.
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months.84 The Law Society of Quebec,"5 for example, agrees with
the CBA that the LSUC has been too restrictive in its approach
and thinks that the bar should press for proper controls as op-
posed to trying to prohibit them outside the practice of law."
2.6.3. Canadian Bar Association s Resolution
At the federal level, the CBA studied the MDP issue exten-
sively and solidly endorsed the formation of MDPs. 87 The CBA
established the International Practice of Law Committee ('IPLC")
in the fall of 1997 to study the MDP issue. 8 As of February 1999,
the IPLC stated that the absolute prohibition on fee-sharing was
not justified. 9 In August 1999, the IPLC released a report enti-
tled "Striking a Balance: Multidisciplinary Practices and the Legal
Profession."9' The TPLC's report stated that "[1]awyers should be
able to offer their services in any business entity delivering serv-
ices, so long as those services conform with applicable regulatory
or other legal requirements.""
84 See id
85 The Law Society of Quebec recently endorsed the formation of MDPs
and plans to make implementation of this type of practice a priority. See Luis
Millan, Quebec Bar Association Solidly Endorses MDPs, LAW. WKLY., May 21,
1999.
86 See Millan, supra note 72.
87 The Federation of Law Societies also studied the MDP issue extensively
and solidly endorsed the formation of MDPs. See Multi-Disciplinary Partner-
ships, Report to the Delegates, prepared by National Multi-Disciplinary Partner-
ships Committee for the Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Aug. 19, 1999,
at 12 [hereinafter Report to Delegates]. In fact, the National Multi-Disciplinary
Partnerships Committee, formed by the Federation of Law Societies of Can-
ada, recommended that they begin the preparation of Model Rules Respecting
Lawyer Participation in Multi-Disciplinary Partnerships. See id.
11 See CAN. BAR ASS'N, STATUS REPORT ON MULTIDISCIPLINARY
PRACTICES, Presented by the Special Committee on the International Practice
of Law at the 1999 Mid-Winter Meeting of Council (Feb. 1999) at 1, at
http://www.cba.org/ mdp/pdf/statusreport eng.pdf [hereinafter Status Re.
port].
89 See id. at 3.
90 See STRIKING A BALANCE, supra note 76; see also Focus on CBA Annual
Meeting: Edmonton to Host Annual CBA Conference, LAW. WKLY., Aug. 20,
1999.
91 Scotton, supra note 73; see also Canadian Bar Association, Multi-
Disciplinary Practices: Summary of Striking a Balance, at http://www.cba.org
/MDflP/SABESummary.asp (last visited Oct. 29, 2000).
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At the time of the release of the IPLC's report in 1999, there
were diverse sentiments about both MDPs and the recommenda-
tions of the IPLC within the CBA.92 However, after a year of ad-
ditional study of the MDP issue, it appears that feelings within
the CBA are no longer mixed.
The CBA met in Halifax in August 2000 to debate the MDP
issue.' At the meeting, the CBA voted overwhelmingly to let
lawyers and non-lawyer professionals join in multidisciplinary
practices.94 The Canadian Bar's liberal approach recognized that
multidisciplinary practices can be created while still protecting
the core values of the profession. Under the CBA's approach, in-
dividual lawyers, not MDPs, are regulated' and the MDPs do not
have to be controlled by lawyers or solely provide legal services."
However, in order to protect the core values of the profession,
lawyers cannot form partnerships with other professionals who
have conflicting ethical responsibilities.'
Aside from the Law Society of Upper Canada, most of the
Canadian law societies are responsive to the CBA's resolution be-
cause they view MDPs as inevitable." The law societies believe
that "the Bar should focus on ensuring that they are regulated so
as to protect the public and so as to ensure that law firms can
compete on a level playing field with MDPs in terms of size,
globalization and so on."99
9 See Multi-Disciplinary Practices: Summary of Striking a Balance, supra
note 91.
" See Eric Atkins, Lawyers Should Control MDPs Says Sask. CBA, LAW.
WKLY., Aug. 18, 2000.
" See Cristin Schmitz, CBA Wants Law Societies to Let Lawyers Join MDPs,
LAW. WKLY., Sept. 1, 2000 ("The CBA's governing Council voted to go boldly
where few countries, other than France and Australia, have gone, by asking
provincial regulators to remove obstacles which make MIDPs impossible.. .
s See id.
See id.
9' See id ("For instance, lawyers practicing in MDPs should not provide
legal services to clients who retain the MDP for auditing services.').
" According to the Treasurer of the LSUC, Robert Armstrong, the CBA
resolution is just a "statement of policy" and it will not persuade the Society to
change its position. Id.
"' Status Report, supra note 88, at 2. The law societies believed that
"[a]ttempting to ensure-lawyer control or a predominance of legal services is
not practica, will restrict lawyers' choices and potential and will be viewed as
lawyers simply protecting their 'turf.'" See id.
2000]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. . Int'I Econ. L.
The CBA's decision stands in stark contrast to the ABA's 3-to-
1 vote against the recommendation to allow lawyers to form
partnerships with non-lawyer professionals. The contradictory
positions of the ABA and the CBA demonstrate that 'MDPs are
viewed by many lawyers as both a danger and an opportunity." "
Canada's resolution struck a balance between two sets of public
interests: the preservation of the lawyers' role in the administra-
tion of justice and the freedom of choice, freedom of association,
and competition and efficiency in the market." 1 The CBA con-
cluded that they were able to endorse the formation of MDPs and
protect the core values of the profession by addressing specific is-
sues that were of particular concern." Canada's proactive en-
dorsement of MDPs supports the conclusion that the ABA's de-
fensive stance is archaic because the core values of the profession
can be protected without Model Rule 5.4.
3. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MDP PROBLEM AND
ACTIVITY OF THE BIG FIvE
3.1. Problem's Significance
Accounting firms are expanding and providing more than just
traditional accounting services. 3 These firms are "aggressively
soliciting clients [and] offering services remarkably similar to
those traditionally offered by law firms.. .. "" This Comment
focuses on the activity of the Big Five accounting firms because
the MDP phenomenon is most evident with them0 ' and the
abundance of public information available" 6 make them good case
studies.
10 Schmitz, supra note 94.
'o' See Multi-Disciplinary Practices: Summary of Striking a Balance, supra
note 91.
102 Issues ofparticular concern include the formation of partnerships with
non-lawyer professionals who have conflicting ethical responsibilities. This
type of partnership is not allowed. Id.
103 See Molvig, supra note 4, at 10.
104 Background Paper, supra note 1, at 2.
105 "[The Big Five's] publicly stated goals are to become major players in
the global marketplace for legal services." Mary C. Daly, Choosing Wise Men
Wisely: The Risks and Rewards of Purchasing Legal Services from Lawyers in a
Multidisciplinary Partnership, 13 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 217, 231 (2000).
"" The familiarity with these firms is garnered through a variety of fo-
rums:
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The accounting firm expansion into the business of law began
about ten years ago when the market for traditional accounting
and tax work decreased and firms looked to consulting and litiga-
tion support to increase their revenue." 7 Currently, accounting
firms "consult on everything from tax matters, mergers and ac-
quisitions, organizational structures, management programs, gov-
ernment relations, employment decisions, defense contracts, stock
options, retirement plans, crisis management, insurance pro-
grams, land development, policies and procedures, real estate
transactions, manufacturing processes, workforce deployment,
Y2K, litigation support, and of course, accounting.
108
Accounting firms have been able to form MDPs in foreign
countries where regulations have been relaxed.09 The Big Five
accounting firms have taken advantage of the standards in France,
Spain, Australia, Canada, and the Confederation of the Independ-
ent States of the former Soviet Union by offering legal services in
those markets.' The Big Five have made significant headway in
Each of the [large accounting] firms [has] several hundred partners.
The[y].. .provide a wide range of services to a broad spectrum of cli-
ents. The vast majority of the [big firms'] clients are the 6,500-plus en-
terprises whose securities are traded in the major stock markets in the
United States and the enterprises listed on the stock exchanges in
other countries.
ANTHONY PHILLIPS ET AL., BASIC ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 73 (4th ed.
1988). As far back as 1988, it was estimated that the large accounting firms had
ninety-five percent of the enterprises listed on the New York Stock Exchange
as their clients. See id.
.07 See Robert M. Cearley, Jr., Multidisciplinary Practice, ARK. LAW., Win-
ter 1999, at 2.
108 Gray, supra note 9, at 4. "The legal profession has generally acknowl-
edged the right of an accounting firm to provide services to its clients that call
for an understanding and application of federal law relating to the taxation of
property, goods, and services." Background Paper, supra note 1, at 9. "In 1981,
the ABA and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA)
adopted a statement in which the two organizations agreed that accounting
firms could provide tax planning advice to clients, but would not draft lega
documents." Iad at 9, n.29. But the accounting firms have become more ag-
gressive; they are offering a broader selection of services and are actively re-
cruiting both law school recruits and practicing attorneys. See id, at 9-10.
109 See Kenneth J. Vacovec, A Multidisciplinary Practice Primer, at
http://161.58.222.91/phpslash/public html/article.php3?sid=20000616114839
(last visited Nov. 9, 2000) [hereinafter' _P Primer].
110 Molvig, supra note 4, at 44.
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Europe and are looking to expand into the United States legal
market."'
The Big Five accounting firms currently employ over 5000
lawyers who provide law-related "consulting" services in the
United States.' 2 Although U.S. attorneys employed by account-
ing firms protect their ethical obligations by stating that they are
not practicing law,"' critics believe these lawyers are engaging in
the unauthorized practice of law. Lawrence J. Fox states, "[t]he
5,000 lawyers practicing law in accounting firms are 'engaged in
civil disobedience and violating Rule 5.4, Rule 1.7 on conflicts of
interest, and Rule 1.6 on client confidentiality." 4
The organized bar historically challenged non-legal ventures
as being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. However, a
more laissez-faire market type has evolved," 5 and the majority of
activity by the Big Five inside the United States has gone unchal-
lenged.
11 6
... The Big Five accounting firms are currently precluded from forming
partnerships with lawyers by Rule 5.4 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (1998).
1' See MDP Primer, supra note 109.
113 See id
114 ABA Refuses to Change Ethics Rules Unless Studies of MDPs Dispel
Concerns, Conference Report Vol. 15, No. 15, Aug. 18, 1999, at 396. See also
Fox, supra note 7, at 21 ("[T]hese lawyers are violating Rule 5.4 by fee sharing
with non-lawyers. Recognizing the impediments presented by Rule 5.4, the
accounting firms argue these lawyers are not practicing law- no, they are
practicing tax or investigations or'mergers and acquisitions. But not law.").
.. See Munneke, supra note 8, at 563.
116 In fact, there are "records of only two recent enforcement actions
against accounting firms." Background Paper, supra note 1, at 10. The state of
Texas lodged a complaint against both Arthur Andersen and Deloitte &
Touche; however, eleven months later the complaint was dismissed. Molvig,
supra note 4, at 12; see also Elizabeth MacDonald, Texas Probes Andersen, De.
loitte on Charges of Practicing of Law, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1998, at B1 (report-
ing the Texas investigation against Deloitte & Touche and Arthur Andersen on
the aforementioned charges). In addition, the January 1999 ABA Background
Paper revealed that there is currently an investigation in Virginia regarding a
charge against Ernst & Young for the unauthorized practice of law. Molvig,
supra note 4, at 12.
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3.2. International Activity of Big Five Accounting Firms"'
The national ambitions of the Big Five are not doubted, nor is
their international success at breaking into the legal market. 118
"MDPs are the subject of intense interest around the world, with
studies or new legislation either pending or recently completed in
Australia, Canada, the CCBE (the European Bar Association),
England, France, the International Bar Association, the Nether-
lands and the Union Internationale des Advocats."' 9 This global
interest has allowed the Big Five to be successful in recruiting top
attorneys. "All combined, they employ more than 5,500 nontax
attorneys worldwide (excluding lawyers practicing tax law exclu-
sively within the firm's accounting or tax divisions) .... 120
3.2.1. Arthur Andersen
By January 1998, Arthur Andersen had subsidiaries practicing
law in England, France, Spain, and Australia.121 As of November
1998, the firm had more than 1500 lawyers working in twenty-
seven different countries." In France, Arthur Andersen took
over the Paris office of the London law firm S.G. Archibald and
renamed it Archibald Andersen Association d'Avocats in 1992.123
In England, Andersen's affiliate, Garrett & Co., has grown to
over 150 lawyers with seven offices in England and Scotland.2
17 The debate over MDPs is not limited to the Big Five accounting firms,
although they are the most visible because of their presence in Europe. An
MDP i-s any partnership between attorneys and non- awyers providing profes-
sional services to the partnership's clients. This Comment is limited to a re-
view of the Big Five accounting firms. However, possible other overlaps and
areas for MDPs include: insurance professionals, financial planners, real estate
consultants, and investment bankers.
118 See, e.g., PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2 ("The head of the
Paris office of Arthur Andersen has stated: We provide all the typical services
of a business law firm.' The head of PricewaterhouseCooper's Brussels office
stated: We're doing more commercial agreements, M&A work and capital
markets. The hope is to expand.'").
19 Testimony of Laurel S. Terry, Professor, Penn State Dickinson School
of Law, Before the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice, at
http://www.aba net.org/cpr/terryremarks.html (Mar. 12, 1999).
120 Molvig, supra note 4, at 44.
12 Cearley, supra note 107, at 2.
122 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
123 Chris Klein, Gold Rush, Thin Stakes: U.S. Branches Face Fierce Competi-
tion From U.K. Solicitors, Accountants, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 1996, at Al.
124 John E. Morris, London Bracesfor the Big Six Invasion, AM. LAW., Dec.
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Additionally, the Spanish law firm J & A Garrigues merged into
Garrigues & Andersen, "to make Andersen the largest law firm in
the world."" s
3.2.2. Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
As of November 1998, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu had 586
lawyers working in fourteen countries,126 including lawyers in
France, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Spain.12  In
France, Deloitte & Touche practices under the name Deloitte et
Touche Juridique et Fiscal.
12
3.2.3. Ernst & Young
According to the American Lawyer, Ernst & Young has more
than 850 lawyers working in thirty-two countries." 9 More than
600 of those lawyers are working in Europe. 30 In addition, Ernst
& Young has a presence in Canada and has acquired Donahue &
Partners, a captive law firm in Toronto. 31
3.2.4. KPMG Peat Marwick
KPMG Peat Marwick has over 980 lawyers working world-
wide."' KMPG recently acquired the largest law firm in France,
1996, at 5.
"2 Cearley, supra note 107, at 2.
126 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
127 Cearley, supra note 107, at 2.
12 Gray, supra note 9, at 4.
129 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
130 See Gray, supra note 9, at 4.
131 Multi-Disciplinary Practice Task Force, The Affiliated or "Captive" Law
Firm (Sept. 1999), at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/services/mdpbkgrdpapercaptive
en.shtml. A captive law firm is one form of MDP arrangement where a law
firm is affiliated with a professional service or accounting firm. It is called
"captive" because of the close affiliation the law firm has with the other profes-
sional service entity. Although there is sharing of office space and computer
equipment, there is supposedly no sharing of fees. The Canadian captive affili-
ated with Ernst & Young is the only example to date. Id.; Janet L. Conley,
ABA Takes on Multidisciplinary Practice, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 5, 1999, at 11; see also
Daly, supra note 105, at 224 ("The terms 'captive' or 'networked' are frequently
used to describe a law firm that has a... close contractual relationship with a
Big Five firm.").
132 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
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DPMG Fidal Peat International."' In the United Kingdom,
KPMG created its own law firm, KLegal, with the expectation
that the Law Society would approve multidisciplinary partner-
ships.3 In addition, KPMG recently formed a strategic alliance
with the U.S. international law firm Morrison & Foerster which
marks the first major tie-up between a Big Five accounting firm
and a United States law firm.
135
3.2.5. PricewaterhouseCoopers
PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") has led the pack with over
1600 lawyers practicing in thirty-nine countries.1"6 In addition,
PwC has law firm affiliates with over 350 lawyers in seventeen
European countries, including 50 in Spain 131 and 160 in France.
1 38
PwC has also "boasted of its aim to build the fifth largest law firm
in the world by the year 2004, estimating that it will employ
three thousand lawyers and generate one billion dollars in reve-
nue.)
1 39
4. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST MDPs
Arguments for and against MDPs can be grouped into two
categories: core values and one-stop shopping. The core value
arguments, addressed below, focus on conflicts of interest, confi-
dentiality, and independence of judgment,"4 while the one-stop
133 See Gray, supra note 9, at 4.
134 Chris Dignan, KPMG Forges Link with Top 25 U.S. Law Practice, THE
LAWYER, Aug. 9, 1999, at 7, available at 1999 WL 9133121.
135 I. Note however, that it is only a tax alliance for the moment. Id. See
also Brenda Sandburg, MOFO Allies With Accounting Giant, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9,
1999, at 2 ("While the agreement is limited solely to the tax arena... , it is a
first step toward the marriage of two diverse practices.").
136 PRELMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
137 In the Spanish market, the law firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers Ju-
ridico y Fiscal merged with Estudio Legal and the Madrid operations of Mul-
lerat & Roca. PRESERVING THE CORE VALUES, supra note 82, at 274.
1 Morris, supra note 124, at 5.
1 Daly, supra note 105, at 231. See also Jim Kelly & Robert Rice, PwC
Plans to Build $1bn Global Law Firm Network- Five-Year Target to be Among the
World's Largest Legal Practices, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 7, 1999, at 24 (an-
nouncing merger talks between PwC and a Spanish law firm).
140 In addition to the core values listed above, the Commission on Multi-
disciplinary Practice addressed competence. The Commission stated that com-
petence is undoubtedly a core value and "[t]he Commission is convinced that
allowing lawyers and nonlawyers to join in a single entity that delivers both
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shopping argument centers on efficiency, quality of work, and ef-
fects of competition.
4.1. Core Values
One of the most important concerns in the amendment of
Model Rule 5.4 is the protection of the core values of the legal
profession. The importance arises from the fact that "[t]he ethical
integrity of the lawyer [is] the profession's hallmark and call for
public confidence. Ethics is not just a set of rules. It is a value-
system, a mind-set, a responsibility that must remain constant in
the lawyer's conscious." 4' The defenders of Model Rule 5.4 con-
tend that this restriction is necessary to preserve a lawyer's ethical
obligations, 42 while the Commission of Multidisciplinary Prac-
tice believes that we can allow the formation of MDPs and safe-
guard the legal profession's core values at the same time. The de-
bate surrounding each of the core values is addressed below.
4.1.1. Conflicts of Interest
Opponents of MDPs argue that work performed in multidis-
ciplinary firms has a significant risk of conflicts of interest. The
problem arises because non-lawyer professionals are "not gov-
erned by lawyers' ethics standards."1 3 For example, "while ac-
countants can do work for clients with competing interests, self-
imposed conflict rules more often than not prohibit entire law
firms from undertaking such representations, even if the conflict
involves only a single lawyer in the firm.', 44 These critics argue
that at the Big Five level, where firms are already competing for
an elite and limited client base, "[c]onflicts thus pose a potentially
insurmountable quandary." 4 '
legal and nonlegal services will have no detrimental effect upon lawyer compe-
tence." ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House
of Delegates, available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mdpfinalrep2000.html
ulY. 2009). In fact, the Commission believes that creating a single entity to
provide client assistance will promote more efficient delivery systems and will
enhance "lawyer competence by expanding the lawyer's integrated knowledge
base." Id
141 Promoting Professionalism, supra note 17.
'42 Background Paper, supra note 1, at 1.
143 Morello, supra note 36, at 245.
144 Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 46.
... Id. at 47. "Moreover, accountants who become advocates for clients
may destroy the independence and objectivity of their own functions in the
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Proponents of MDPs argue that the core values, including
lawyers' rules governing conflicts of interest, are only threatened
when the multidisciplinary business entity is controlled by non-
lawyers. In situations where there is not control by a lawyer, the
Commission recommends reliance on the control and authority
principle put forth in their Recommendation. "As part of the
control and authority principle.., the lawyers in an MDP, not
the nonlawyer professionals, will determine the application of the
conflicts of interest rules to the clients of the MDP seeking legal
services."14 This will ensure that conflicts of interest matters are
handled properly.
4.1.2. Possible Threats to the Confidentiality of Client
Information
Opponents of MDPs argue that accounting firms and lawyers
are not governed by the same rules and that the integration of
their services is incompatible; this is especially evident in areas
such as the confidentiality of client communications. 47 In the
traditional legal setting, "[c]lients are expected to and generally
provide candid communications with their attorneys. Clients
rely upon and have the right to expect that those communications
will remain confidential and will be used exclusively for their
benefit."4 The fear is that if a client uses the services of an MP
and the client's dispute ends in a lawsuit, any communications the
client had with an attorney would be protected under the attor-
ney/client privilege but that same privilege would not be ex-
tended to communications with accountants.149 For instance, "the
process." Id.
146 ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the House
of Delegates, supra note 140.
147 See Morello, supra note 36, at 245.
14 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 3.
149 One critic of MDPs, Lawrence J. Fox, has called accounting firms
a one-profession wrecking crew, destroying any ethical rules that
stand in their path. Take confidentiality. Our rules preserve confi-
dential treatment for all information learned in the course of a repre-
sentation .... By definition, the core value of the attest function of
an accounting firm is the public disclosure of material information.
Fox, supra note 7, at 21.
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accountant with whom the client has shared information could be
called as a witness- against the client.""'0
Advocates of MDPs point out that it would be possible to
form business structures integrating the services of attorneys with
other non-attorney professionals in such a way that the attor-
ney/client privilege is retained. In addition, the problem of lack
of privilege between non-lawyers and clients is not new.
"[C]lients today may enter a traditional law firm and reveal their
cases to nonlawyers such as clerks, and thus lose the attorney-
client privilege." 1  Attorneys deal with this problem currently in
the traditional law firm and the same type of problem is not in-
surmountable in an MDP.
The Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice suggests that
to effectively secure the protection of client confidences, an af-
firmative responsibility should be placed on the lawyer.15 The
lawyer would be responsible for assuring "(1) that the communi-
cations the lawyer and client intend to be protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege satisfy the jurisdiction's applicable require-
ments, and (2) that the client understands that all other
communications are not privileged.""5 3
In both 1999 and 2000, the Commission on Multidisciplinary
Practice emphasized the importance of the protection of confi-
dential information. However, this year the Commission explic-
itly stated its view, in agreement with the opponents of MDPs,
that because of the differing rules regarding disclosure of client in-
formation to a third party in auditing versus legal services, there
is in fact incompatibility between these two services. The Com-
mission does not "believe that a single entity should be allowed to
provide legal and audit services to the same client." 154 However,
unlike the opponents of MDPs, the Commission does not believe
this incompatibility serves as an absolute bar to the formation of
other types of multidisciplinary practices.5 5
150 Molvig, supra note 4, at 44.
151 Morello, supra note 36, at 246.
152 See ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice Report to the
House of Delegates, supra note 140.
153 Id.
154 Id. According to the Commission, the Independence Standards Board is
currently evaluating the issue of incompatibility. Id.
155 Id.
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4.1.3. Challenges to Independence ofJudgment
Critics of multidisciplinary practice argue that MDPs threaten
the independent professional judgment of lawyers. Non-lawyers
may influence lawyers' decisions regarding law firm management,
the firm's involvement in legal activities, and the public role of
the firm's attorneys."6 "They say that if lawyers deliver legal
services to non-employer clients.., the influence of the bottom
line will overpower the lawyers' ability to be loyal to the client or
to make independent decisions with judgment unclouded by con-
siderations of profit."' Opponents further argue that Model
Rule 5.4's ban on fee-sharing and partnerships with non-attorneys
is the "only prohibition that is likely to be effective in maintain-
ing [lawyers'] professional independence."5 8
The rationale underlying the argument of those against the
formation of MDPs is the belief that if a lawyer is answerable to a
nonlawyer or shares fees with a nonlawyer, "there is an over-
whelming risk that the lawyer's professional judgment could be
swayed by his or her own economic interests or by other im-
proper considerations."5 9 There are two responses to why this ba-
sic assumption is incorrect.
First, "[t]o suggest that today's law practice operates free of
the influence of profit flies in the face of every recent trend."60
Even if accounting firms are concerned about cutting costs, this is
not a new concern. There are competitive pressures in the legal
industry for law firms to keep down costs as well.' 6'
Second, attorney subjection to pressures from non-lawyers is
not new.162 In fact, it is currently happening in the legal industry.
156 Id.
17 Eleanor W. Myers, Multidisciplinary Practice Debate Continues: It's Time
to Redefine What We as Lawyers Really Do, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 12,
1999, at 11.
158 Fox, supra note 7, at 20.
159 James W. Jones, Remarks at the Phyllis W. Beck Chair in Law Sympo-
sium at Temple University Beasley School of Law (Nov. 12, 1999), at 12 (cri-
tiquing the traditional rationale for prohibiting non-lawyer ownership interest
inlaw firms) [hereinafter Jones' Remarks].
160 Myers, supra note 157, at 12.
161 See Ted Schneyer, Reputational Bonding Ethics Rules, and Law Firm
Structure: The Economist as Storyteller, 84 VA. L. REV. 1777, 1791 (1998).
162 Professor Robert Gordon stated in testimony at the ABA Commission
hearings that:
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"[T]he bar has already recognized and approved situations in
which lawyers may work for, and even be supervised and com-
pensated entirely by non-lawyers, without compromising their
professional integrity or judgment."163 Examples of such situa-
tions include in-house counsel, government lawyers, and legal
services attorneys." Thus, MDP advocates argue that the "con-
cern about diluting the independent judgment of lawyers is only a
matter of degree."165
In order to protect the independent judgment of lawyers, the
Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice recommended allow-
ing the formation of MDPs only if the lawyers maintain the "con-
trol and authority necessary to assure lawyer independence."166
The Commission's Report stated that the control and authority
requirement can be satisfied in a variety of ways.6 Factors such
as the percentage of ownership by lawyers or the primary pur-
Any and all forms of professional practice are subject to pressures,
constraints, and temptations- pressures from hierarchical superiors or
peers, payment systems or fee arrangements, incentives to career ad-
vancement or financial reward inside the firms or in the profession
generally- that may to a greater or lesser extent compromise the ex-
ercise of a lawyer's independent judgment. Over the course of this
century, the legal profession has adopted many arrangements and or-
ganizational forms for representing clients and receiving payment for
services that pose conflicts between their own interests on the one
hand and the interests of clients and the public good on the other.
Hourly billing, to take one of many examples, tempts some lawyers to
run the meter, churn cases, and pad bills; contingent fees, to take an-
other, tempts others to shirk on effort, and settle early and low. Such
conflicts are unavoidable: No set of arrangements has ever been or
ever will be devised that will entirely remove such pressures and temp-
tations. The question your Commission has to ask is, Do the pro-
posed arrangements for lawyers to practice with non-lawyers promise
to add any significant sources of pressure, constraint, and temptation
to those that already exist? And even [if] the answer to that question
should turn out to be Yes (or Maybe), does the likely cost or risk of
adding new sources of pressure o set the likely benefits of multidisci-
plinary practices?
Letter from Robert W. Gordon, Professor, Yale Law School, to Sherwin P.
Simmons, Esq., Chair, ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice (May
21, 1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/cpr/gordon.html; Jones' Re-
marks, supra note 159, at 11.
16 Jones' Remarks, supra note 159, at 12.
164 See id.
165 Myers, supra note 157, at 12.
166 A.B.A., supra note 59.
'67 See id at 2.
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pose of the IMDP (if it is to deliver legal services) may sometimes
be determinative of the control and authority of lawyers in
MDPs. However, the Commission did not believe that these fac-
tors conclusively determined either control or authority.'68 The
Commission believed that independence of judgment could be
protected not by dictating the nature and mode of delivery of le-
gal services by MDPs, but by allowing states to "identify and en-
force the particular structures that they determine are necessary
to protect the interests of clients."" 9
4.2. One-Stop Shopping
Advocates of one-stop shopping endorse the formation of
MDPs because they believe that different disciplines working to-
gether in MDPs will provide the client with greater convenience
and access; by going to just one place, a client can receive assis-
tance for all of his/her needs. Proponents argue that the restric-
tions banning the formation of MDPs are outdated."7  "In their
view, these restrictions are the unfortunate relics of a regulatory
system constructed in the early twentieth century that now im-
pede the delivery of efficient and reasonably priced professional
services."'71
Supporters also argue that the ban on fee-sharing and on the
formation of partnerships prevents law firms from taking advan-
tage of the possible economies of scale that could result from
combining legal and ancillary services within the same com-
168 Id. The Commission believes that "Itlhe control and authority princi-
ple looks to substance not form." Id
169 Id. Although the Commission's Report appears to avoid defining the
appropriate delivery of legal services in MDPs, the Commission does state that
in large MDPs, a minimum level of safeguards should include:
(1) structuring the MDP so that the lawyers who are delivering legal
services to the MP's clients are organized and supervised separately
from the MDP's other units ... and (2) establishing a chain-of-
command in which these lawyers report to a lawyer-supervisor whose
responsibilities include hiring and firing, fixing the lawyers' compen-
sation and terms of service, making decisions with respect to profes-
sional issues such as staffing of legal matters and the allocation of law-
yer and paraprofessional resources, and advising on issues of
professional responsibility.
Id.
170 Background Paper, supra note 1, at 1.
171 Id.
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pany."7 Clients would benefit from an MDP's ability to combine
legal and extralegal issues; this would result in increased efficiency
and reduced costs." '"Moreover, because legal and law-related
services can be substitutes, albeit imperfect ones, the ban may bias
firms toward performing excessive legal services rather than refer-
ring clients to outside providers of less expensive but equally
valuable law-related services."174
In addition, MDPs promote more comprehensive solutions to
client problems..5 and '"ig [Five] accounting firms maintain that
their worldwide offices enable them to satisfy the needs of multi-
national corporate and financial business consulting clients."" 6
Opponents of MDPs and one-stop shopping argue that law-
yers' competence and diligence may be threatened because they
will be distracted from the practice of law.177 The opponents be-
lieve that the costs to the legal profession outweigh the possible
convenience to the client.
Duty to clients is impaired because the practitioners of
each discipline or profession are not independent of each
other. Therefore, the practitioners are not in a position to
give the client one of the important components of profes-
sional service- an independent evaluation of one an-
other's qualifications or performance.
Duty to society is impaired, because if such firms become
characteristic of professional practice they are likely, over
a period of time, to reduce the distinctiveness of law as a
separate profession. Indeed, the multidisciplinary law firm
17 See Schneyer, supra note 161, at 1792 (noting structural drawbacks cre-
ated by banning non-lawyer professionals from investing in law firms).
173 See Morello, supra note 36, at 239; see also Molvig, supra note 4, at 43
("[P]roponents contend that MDPs match with the way organizations like to
solve problems in today's world: by bringing together teams of professionals
from multiple disciplines. If lawyers can't be part of MDPs, proponents say,
they risk becoming dinosaurs.").
174 Schneyer, supra note 161, at 1792.
175 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 3.
176 Morello, supra note 36, at 244.
177 See Morello, supra note 36, at 246 (setting forth the arguments often ad-
vanced by opponents of MDPs).
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may become indistinguishable from multidisciplinary
groups organized by members of other disciplines, such as
accounting, business management, or financial manage-
ment.
178
Opponents claim that clients can gain the same benefits of an
MDP by hiring professionals from different disciplines to work
together with a lawyer."9 They argue that although there may be
a need for the services of several different specialists, there is no
need to house them all under one roof....
One critic of MDPs stated that "[o]ne-stop shopping.., is just
a benign way of describing the destruction of everything lawyers
should and must stand for."' Other challengers fear that society
will end up with a bunch of general problem-solvers and no spe-
cialists."82
5. WHY THE MODEL RULES SHOULD BE
MODIFIED TO ALLOW MDPs
5.1. MDPs Serve the Public Interest
When the ABA Commission on Multidisciplinary Practice
was created, Philip Anderson, president of the ABA, asked the
Commission to put the interests of the public before the legal
profession. 3 All lawyers are required to place their clients' needs
178 Id
179 See BackRound Paper, supra note 1, at 12 (describing arguments for and
against the deveTopment of MDPs).
180 See Levinson, supra note 178, at 803-04 (claiming that housing different
specialists in one conglomerate "impairs the firm's duty to both its clients as
well as to society in general").
... Fox, supra note 7, at 24.
182 See Levinson, supra note 178, at 804. One such opponent of MiDPs has
described this problem:
[L]a wers perform a unique role, by making society's legal system ac-
cessible to society. In order to perform this role effectively, lawyers
should retain distinctive attitudes, traditions, and methods of reason-
ing and analysis. This does not mean we must be locked into archaic
processes. Of course, we must constantly update and refine our tech-
niques, but we should do so as lawyers, with full regard to the duty we
owe to society's legal system.
Id.
18 See Anderson, supra note 44.
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above their own,"' but client protection does not justify main-
taining an archaic system while the rest of the world continues to
develop. Removing the statutory ban that precludes lawyers
from forming partnerships with non-lawyers will result in
cheaper prices, as well as increased access and greater justice.
1 8 5
Critics of MDPs often claim that no client demand for MDPs ac-
tually exists and the entire issue is a fiction the Big Five has cre-
ated to generate more revenue.186 However, even if clients do not
specifically demand a multidisciplinary business structure, they
do "increasingly demand efficient, timely, comprehensive, and
cost-effective services of all of their professional providers." '
MDPs are more efficient than traditional business structures and
"there is no reason that clients should not be offered the choice of
an MDP as one means of meeting their needs." 8
Client demand for MDPs exists on both the corporate and
solo practitioner level. MDPs have the promise of enhancing the
practices of small firms and delivering legal services to underrep-
resented areas.8 9 Strong consumer interest in MDPs is also con-
firmed by the Reporter Notes from the ABA-MDP Commission's
Report. After over sixty hours of testimony, Mary Daly wrote:
The Commission heard strong testimony from business
clients, representatives of consumer groups, and ABA enti-
ties that amending the Model Rules to permit fee sharing
and partnership and other association with a nonlawyer is
in the best interest of the public. Of particular signifi-
cance to the Commission was the view of the Council of
the ABA General Practice, Solo and Small Firm Section,
noting the need for multidisciplinary counseling of indi-
vidual and business clients [in small firms] .... The ethics
counsel to the Arizona State Bar told the Commission that
she has received a substantial number of inquiries from
184 See PRELMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
185 Denckla, supra note 21, at 2581, 2599 (describing how the lawyer mo-
nopoly is responsible for a lack of affordable options for low- to moderate-
income persons).
186 See Jones' Remarks, supra note 159, at 8.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 See id. at 9.
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lawyers in Arizona expressing an interest in forming a
partnership with a nonlawyer. An informal survey of the
opinions of state bar associations ethics committees... in-
dicates that the overwhelming majority of the inquiries on
this subject appear to have been submitted by lawyers in
solo or small firms. 90
In addition, the Financial Times published a survey in Sep-
tember 1999 reporting that seventy-five percent of major corpora-
tions in the United States were willing to consider using MDPs.'9'
Even if demand for MDPs is not initially apparent, such practices
should be allowed due to the willingness of consumers to embrace
such a change."
5.2. Economic Rule Rather Than Ethical Rule
All lawyers are required to place their clients' interest above
their own; this is also true of monetary interests. Attorneys can-
not place the financial interests of their profession before the
well-being of their clients.'93 Maintaining the current Rule 5.4
which bans the formation of MDPs promotes the lawyers' mo-
nopoly on the legal market.'94 Removing the current prohibi-
tions on MDPs will allow attorneys to compete more effectively
in today's market and "[s]uch changes might actually help law
firms survive in the coming decades."' MDPs will create more
effective delivery models for legal services, more efficient invest-
ment in resources, and more comprehensive solutions to client
190 MDP Commission Report, at C9 (footnotes omitted), quoted in Jones'
Remarks, supra note 159, at 9-10.
191 See Jim Kelly, Long Arm of the Law: The Big Five May Be Right That Cli-
ents Want Them to Move into Legal Services, FIN. TIME , Sept. 9, 1999, at 29; see
also Jones' Remarks, supra note 159, at 8 (stating that "[t]ie survey found that
more than half of the respondents in Europe and the U. S. said they would
consider using MDPs for certain kinds of legal services, and among financial
institutions in the U.S. the number rose to 75 percent").
19 See Joe Dwyer III, Carlie, Walsh Weigh in on Law-accounting Union, ST.
LouIs BUS. J., Aug. 2-8, 1999, at 59 ("In service delivery, demand drives the
model. If the client doesn't see an improvement in delivery or cost of service,
then this could be a non-event.") (interview with Stone Carlie Co's. chief ex-
ecutive, Mark Carlie).
193 See PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 43, at 2.
194 See Background Paper, supra note 1, at 12.
195 Munneke, supra note 8, at 568.
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problems.196 As one commentator wrote, "It is both naive and
self-destructive for the legal profession to expect to remain un-
touched by the structural and technological upheavals that, over
the course of the past twenty-five years, have reordered the finan-
cial and industrial markets and redrawn the world's geo-political
map."197
Another proponent of MDPs concurred that "[w]e do not
need and can ill-afford archaic rules designed merely to maintain
the economic hegemony of the legal profession, especially when
those rules have become counterproductive to their original pur-
pose."'9 The current Rule 5.4 enables lawyers to "maximize
wealth and limit competition" and fails to serve the public interest
or advance the administration of justice. 99
5.3. Following the Example of the Canadian Bar Association
and Eliminating the Ban on MDPs
European jurisdictions permit various forms of MDPs ranging
from captive law firms to full partnerships." Currently, MDPs
are a well-established reality in Spain, France, Switzerland, and
Belgium. In Australia, New South Wales has modified its regula-
tory scheme to allow the formation of MDPs. "In the UK, the
Law Society of England and Wales has given its backing to the
concept of MDPs which has allowed a number of law firms to be
snapped up by the Big Five."" 1 In Canada, the Canadian Bar As-
sociation has endorsed the formation of multidisciplinary prac-
tices and is encouraging its law societies to amend their rules to
allow lawyers to form partnerships with non-lawyer profession-
als.
The comparison of the U.S. system to that of Canada is use-
ful, as the CBA, the Federation of Law Societies, and many of the
provincial law societies have undertaken extensive study of the
MDP issue focusing on furthering the public interest while pro-
tecting the same core values that we seek to protect. In addition,
196 Background Paper, supra note 1, at 13.
197 Daly, supra note 105, at 281.
198 Munneke, supra note 8, at 615.
199 See Promoting Professionalism, supra note 17.
200 See Background Paper, supra note 1, at 6-8.
201 Mandy Smith, MDPs: Face the Challenge, INT'L AccT. BULL., Sept. 19,
2000, at 8.
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the CBA thinks it is important to watch the ABA and the actions
of the United States. "Given the potential for competition be-
tween firms in adjoining jurisdictions, the [CBA] believes it is
necessary for a consistent North American position on the is-
sue."2) 2 Given this competition and the advances abroad, it may be
equally important for the United States to stay in step with Can-
ada.
Critics of MDPs disregard the evidence of MDPs in other
countries and claim that the American profession is different.0 3
While it is true that many foreign countries have varied concepts
of the role of the lawyer, this does not serve as a justification for
American lawyers avoiding progressivity. In addition, as one Ca-
nadian writing on the issue has stated, it is important to watch the
international development of MDPs because "[a]s [they] grow
elsewhere, the economic pressure to permit home-based MDPs
will grow correspondingly in every country, particularly those
that have ambitions to be significant players in the international
market for services. "2°4 One can argue that not amending the
Model Rules to permit MDPs will prohibit the United States
from maintaining its position as a significant player in the inter-
national market.
5.4. MDPs are Already in Existence in the United States
Rule 5.4 bans fee-splitting and partnerships with non-
attorneys; however, law firms are "inching closer" to MDPs05 and
202 Status Report, supra note 87, at 3.
203 In response to international MDP developments, Lawrence J. Fox
states, "[w]hatever may be the role of lawyers in these other countries where
the Big Five have swallowed law firms wit nary a whimper, our profession in
America is different." Fox, supra note 7, at 24. Another perspective on the in-
ternational development was that of Leslie W. Jacobs of Cleveland, who told
the delegates that
the growth of MDPs in Europe has more to do with 'the historic ante-
cedents of law practice in Europe, which are entirely different than
our own.' He pointed out that civil law systems 'are not founded on
advocacy,' and that in Europe 'there has never been a comparable con-
cept to the unauthorized practice of law.'
ABA Refuses to Change Ethics Rules Unless Studies of MDPs Dispel Concerns, 15
Conference Report, Aug. 18, 1999, at 397 [hereinafter ABA Conference Re-
port].
204 BUCKLEY, supra note 77, at 3.
205 See Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Law Firm Management: Law and Finance
under One Roof, NAT'L. L.J., Nov. 15, 1999, at A21.
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"such activities appear to be evolving with or without the impri-
matur of the organized bar."06 In addition, regardless of what the
ABA House of Delegates ultimately decides, MDPs will continue
to be created and "new delivery systems will continue to be
forged by entrepreneurial lawyers."2' 7
The presence of MDPs in the United States is evidenced by
traditional U.S. law firms preparing for the invasion of the Big
Five either by forming separate ancillary businesses0 . or by form-
ing joint ventures and strategic alliances with non-legal entities. 9
In addition, there are many lawyers who work in accounting
firms in the United States today; they simply state that they are
not violating Rule 5.4 because they are not practicing law.210 The
problem with lawyers working in accounting firms in the United
States is that this type of behavior occurs outside the ban of Rule
5.4; thus, these attorneys are not subject to any ethical regula-
tions.
[B]y insisting that lawyers can practice law only in tradi-
tional law firm settings, we effectively force lawyers who
want to offer their services in non-traditional ways out of
the profession. As a consequence, we compel such expa-
triates to characterize the services they provide as some-
thing other than "legal services" and we exclude such offer-
ings from the bar's ethical and disciplinary system.1
206 Munneke, supra note 8, at 566.
207 Id. at 567.
218 See Background Paper, supra note 1, at 13.
209 In what appears to be the first joint venture between a law firm trust
group and an investment company, the Boston-based law firm Bingham Dana
L.L.P. announced that the firm had formed an investment management and
trust administration group with Baltimore investment giant Legg Mason, Inc.
in October of 1999. Shepherd, supra note 205, at A21.
210 One such explanation for this behavior is that: "[t]hey are getting away
with this because the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do not include a
definition of the practice of law." ABA Conference Report, supra note 203, at
397. The principles in the MDP Commission's report would define the prac-
tice of law to include lawyers in MDPs and would thereby ensure that these
lawyers do not practice law in MDPs unless they adhere to ethical standards
applicable to all lawyers and uphold the core values of the profession." Id
211 Jones' Remarks, supra note 159, at 15.
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The goal should be to assert ethical regulation over all attor-
neys offering legal services, regardless of the economic or organ-
izational structure of their business.212
5.5. ABA House ofDelegates'Refusal to Modify Rules
Should Be Neither Disheartening Nor Surprising
Although the ABA is not yet ready to accept recommenda-
tions for allowing the formation of MDPs, its resistance is neither
surprising nor disheartening. As James Jones remarked at a re-
cent seminar on multidisciplinary practices, "the American legal
profession.., has always been quite resistant to any changes in
the practice of law. This has been especially true where a change
threatened to reorder well established economic interests within
the profession."
2 13
Examples documenting the legal profession's aversion to
change begin as far back as a century ago and continue today. At
the end of the last century, the introduction of the modern law
firm was criticized as selling out the profession to commercial in-
terests. 24 The development of in-house law departments by cor-
porations was condemned by many members of the bar as threat-
ening the independence of lawyers.21  "In the 1930's, the
introduction of group legal service plans.., to provide affordable
legal services to low- and moderate-income people, was also vig-
orously attacked by the bar and ultimately resolved only in a se-
ries of Supreme Court decisions in the 1960's and early 1970's that
the bar lost."21 6 The 1970s saw the introduction of paralegals and
again the bar was resistant, claiming it was the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.2"7  Finally, "the debate within the profession in the
late 1980's and early 1990's about ancillary businesses" was so
heated that one prominent critic pronounced it as "the end of the
profession as we know it." 211 Jones concluded his speech by stat-
ing:
212 ld
213 Id. at 6.
214 Id.
215 ld
216 Td
217 Id. at 7.
218 Id
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The point is that virtually every innovation in the practice
of law over the past 100 years has been, at least initially,
criticized and often roundly condemned by the organized
bar. In my view, the current debate over MDPs fits the
same pattern. And yet, despite the nay-sayers and the
prophets of doom- and there have been plenty of them-
I think that the American legal profession is better and
stronger today because of almost all of the changes de-
scribed above.219
The bar's critical response to the introduction of MDPs
should not be surprising. It is merely the bar's typical response to
another development in a series of market driven attempts "de-
signed to make legal services more accessible, more efficient, and
more cost effective."20
6. CONCLUSION
Multidisciplinary practices have developed abroad in response
to the consolidation of global markets and client demands for ef-
ficiency." Other countries, such as Canada, are rapidly changing
and endorsing the formation of MDPs; however, the United
States remains fixed to an archaic model which prohibits fee-
sharing and partnership agreements with non-attorneys.
Lawyers are supposed to adhere to that which came before, m
but society has not remained static. This requires changing the
ethical rules to reflect today's society.' Meanwhile, as the debate
219 Id.
20 Id at 16.
221 Anderson, supra note 44, at B21.
2n One observer noted that:
We lawyers, after all, are supposed to be the keepers of the status quo,
the preservers of the past. Stare decisis is nothing if it's not about ad-
hering to that which came before .... [W]e are living in extraordi-
nary times. For the first time since the founding of this country, we
are experiencing fundamental, revolutionary technological and social
change in virtu y every aspect of our daily lives.
Roberta R. Katz, At a Crossroads: Law, Courts, and Legal Practice at the End of
the 20th Century, 15 COMPuTER LAW., Apr. 1998, at 14.
22 Other commentators have concurred with this view: "The ABA has an
ongoing goal of stimulating conduct that reflects high moral ground, our soci-
ety has not remained static nor can our ethics rule." Promoting Professional-
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continues, the Big Five are gearing up to practice law in the
United States.
The Model Rules should be amended to allow the formation
of MDPs for three reasons. First, the rule serves lawyers' finan-
cial interest rather than the public interest. With regulation of
non-lawyer controlled MDPs, the core values of the legal profes-
sion are protected. Model Rule 5.4 can no longer be defended,
and as a result, becomes anti-competitive. Second, Model Rule
5.4 is an economic rule- not an ethical one. Rather than worry-
ing about the legal profession's ability to compete with the Big
Five to provide legal services to corporate America, the focus
must be on ensuring that clients have legal services that are deliv-
ered efficiently. Finally, as state and local bars continue to study
the issue, the United States should look abroad to the positive
models provided by foreign countries as evidence of the demand
for and success of MDPs in the marketplace.
ism, supra note 17.
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